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ABSTRACT
EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean after the Arab 
uprisings are predominantly seen in the literature as marked by continuity 
with the past. This is attributed to the fact that the EU still acts with the aim 
of maximising its security by preserving stability in the region. By 
examining a range of policy areas, this special issue aims to assess and 
qualify this claim. Its introduction outlines our case on both empirical and 
analytical grounds. Empirically, it is argued that we need to offer a more 
detailed analysis of each specific policy area to assess the extent of 
continuity and change. Analytically, this introduction proposes a framework 
that focuses on processes of frame definition and frame enactment to 
explain change and continuity in the EU’s approach. More specifically, 
security, stability and the link between them – the security–stability nexus 
– are considered as the master frame shaping the EU’s approach 
towards the Southern Mediterranean. This is enacted along two 
dimensions: the modalities of EU engagement with Southern 
Mediterranean partners; and the range of actors engaged.
Introduction
The preservation of stability in the region with the aim of maximizing EU secu-
rity has long been identified as the key driver of EU policies in the Southern 
Mediterranean. Much of the literature suggests that this linkage continues to 
inform EU policies towards the region also following the Arab uprisings (e.g. 
Colombo & Tocci, 2012; Teti, 2012). Examining a wide range of policy areas, 
this special issue probes this reading from both an empirical and analytical 
standpoint. Empirically, the claim of continuity in EU policies in the aftermath 
of the Arab uprisings deserves further analysis, as most of the existing literature 
looks at the EU’s overall approach and documents, without examining if and 
how different EU policy domains have been affected. As the contributions to 
this special issue show, the claim of continuity needs to be contextualized, and 
partial change might provide a better description of what has happened.
Analytically, and challenging the dichotomy between interests and norms 
that exists in the current literature on EU policies towards the Southern 
Mediterranean, this special issue investigates frames and their policy enactment. 
While it is well established that frames matter in shaping policies (e.g. Bicchi 
2007; Daviter, 2011; Hay, 2011), it remains less clear ‘how’ they matter. Drawing 
from existing literature, this special issue accepts that security and stability are 
key linchpins of the EU policies in the Southern Mediterranean, and argues that 
this security–stability nexus constitutes the ‘master frame’ shaping the EU overall 
approach to the region. However, instead of taking for granted the meaning of 
these two concepts, it proposes to discuss how this master frame – and hence 
security, stability and the link between them – is defined and interpreted in 
each policy area. This approach also assesses how this frame is enacted via the 
modalities of EU engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners as well as 
the actors that it engages with. There are two significant implications to this. On 
the one hand, the final policies adopted by the EU are not merely the application 
of a single frame, but are rather articulated through engagement with relevant 
actors in the region, and are thus the result of a dialogical interaction. On the 
other hand, the EU’s degree of inclusiveness and the modalities of engagement 
also hold the potential of reflecting back on the frame, thus affecting how sta-
bility and security are understood and linked in each specific policy area.
In empirical terms, all contributions discuss change and continuity in EU poli-
cies with reference to the same timeframe, starting from the establishment of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and focusing on the EU’s reaction to the 
Arab uprisings up until the end of 2015, and in light of the ‘security-stability nexus’. 
To offer a comprehensive and detailed overview of change or continuity in the EU’s 
approach, contributions address different policy areas or specific issues that have 
acquired relevance following the Arab uprisings. With respect to the Arab uprisings 
themselves, the contributions look at EU policies towards selected countries (Egypt, 
Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Morocco and Jordan) or towards the overall region.
This introduction proceeds as follows. By surveying the literature on EU 
relations with the Southern Mediterranean, the first section questions current 
accounts of continuity in EU’s approach and asks whether we can detect any 
form of change after the Arab uprisings in specific policy areas. The second 
section focuses on frames, and identifies in the security–stability nexus the 
master frame organizing EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. At 
the same time, neither stability nor security nor the nexus between them are 
self-evident, and indeed they are very much the result of contingent, and hence 
political, processes of construction, negotiation and also contestation. In light 
of this, the third section focuses on how the EU engages with the region on the 
basis of the frames that guide its actions. Attention is devoted to two aspects: 
the modalities of engagement and the actors that the EU engages with. The 
final section briefly outlines the articles in the special issue, while an analytical 
account of the overall contributions to the literature is left for the conclusion.
Changing neighbourhood, unchanging policies?
Most research on EU relations with the Southern Mediterranean is character-
ized by an assessment of EU policies and instruments, often combined with an 
evaluation of the nature of EU power. The idea that the EU acts as a ‘normative 
power’ (Manners, 2002), driven by its values and promoting a new definition 
of what is ‘normal’ in international politics, has been severely challenged by 
the yawning rhetoric-practice gap observed in the case of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. Calling a bluff on the EU’s rhetorical commitment to democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights, most literature offers an interest-driven narrative 
of EU policies towards the region, in which security and economic concerns 
prevail (e.g. Cavatorta et al., 2008; Durac & Cavatorta, 2009; Joffé, 2008; Seeberg, 
2009). Before the Arab uprisings, the EU was willing to support authoritarian 
regimes, providing them with much needed international legitimacy and finan-
cial support, whenever this was perceived as functional to achieving its security 
objectives, even if this was against the proclaimed imperative of supporting 
democracy (cf. Gillespie & Youngs, 2002; Volpi & Cavatorta, 2006).
After an initial phase of puzzlement, the EU response to the Arab uprisings 
(see European Commission, 2011a, 2011b) highlighted a need for a qualitative 
shift in its relations with its southern neighbours. This was embodied in the com-
mitment for a ‘more for more’ approach, meant to differentiate among countries 
and reward those more committed to reforms. However, the academic consen-
sus is that these changes have not really altered the substance of EU policies 
towards the Southern Mediterranean, which are still dominated by concerns 
revolving around stability and security (see Colombo & Tocci, 2012; Teti, 2012; 
Tocci & Cassarino, 2011). A return to a ‘business as usual model’, as aptly put by 
Zardo and Cavatorta (2016: 13), has been understood by some scholars as a 
function of internal institutional dynamics, with EU policies raising their profile 
only in those sectors in which significant common ground among its members 
could be found, such as migration and trade (Noutcheva, 2015). Following from 
this, support for ‘deep democracy’ and ‘inclusive development’ has lacked teeth 
from its very inception, as it was perceived as a possible threat for agreed eco-
nomic and security interests. According to this literature, substantial continuity 
in EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean, characterized by a strong 
preference for political stability, reflects substantial continuity in the EU’s secu-
rity and economic interests. Because these interests were served well before 
the uprisings and are still well served now, there might not be any need for 
substantive policy change. The 2015 Review of the ENP seems to confirm this 
trend (European Commission, 2015), as it demonstrates a limited grasp of the 
root causes of the Arab uprisings, focusing squarely on cooperation on security, 
migration and economic issues.
Despite its prima facie plausibility, this special issue questions this interpre-
tation, suggesting that it is limited in two important respects. On the one hand, 
it takes for granted what the EU interests are in its relations with partners in the 
Southern Mediterranean. As discussed in the next section, security and stability 
might mean significantly different things in different sectors at different times. 
On the other hand, interest-based explanations tend to downplay the degree 
of uncertainty generated by the uprisings within the EU and its member states, 
and the possibilities for transformative policy change that came with it (for 
exceptions, see Natorski, 2016; Pace, 2014).
Countering rational choice institutionalist approaches, we contend that inter-
ests are not given but rather socially constructed, and that they are plural, with 
the implication that interests are not naturally ordered, and often compete and 
clash with one another. On the first point, much literature on EU relations with 
the Southern Mediterranean implies a direct causal path whereby material fac-
tors determine interests, which in turn determine behaviour (Durac & Cavatorta, 
2009). However, even in the most rationalist accounts this path holds only if two 
conditions are verified: actor’s rationality and perfect information. Especially 
the latter hardly holds in international relations in general, and even more so 
with reference to the EU in the region. Here, imperfect information is likely to 
permeate both EU relations with Southern Mediterranean partners and relations 
between different actors with an input into the EU approach to the region. Most 
importantly, the rationalist approach entirely sidesteps the issue of perception, 
which is all the more relevant under conditions of imperfect information and 
bounded rationality, where actors cannot but act on the basis of established 
cognitive filters and paradigms, functioning as lenses through which they inter-
pret the surrounding environment (DiMaggio, 1997; Levy, 2013; Vertzberger, 
1990). As Hay puts it, ‘actor’s conduct is not a (direct) reflection of their material 
self-interest but, rather, a reflection of particular perceptions of their material 
self-interest’ (2011: 70). Thus, interests are necessarily the mediation between 
material and ideational factors, to be understood not as an ontological dichot-
omy, but rather as an interactive duality (Giddens, 1984; Gofas & Hay, 2010). 
Additionally, the plurality of interests and their articulations is particularly visible 
in complex entities such as the EU, encompassing a variety of actors dispersed 
among different levels and types of governance. In this respect, the very defi-
nition of what an interest is, both in general and in specific sectors, is a political 
act which institutionalizes the contingent outcome of a political struggle. As 
such, there is not a predetermined and unambiguous definition of interests, to 
be then mapped onto a clear hierarchy of priorities to be pursued. Rather, there 
is a great degree of negotiation, competition and even conflict, both within the 
EU and in its engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners, on which 
perceived interests are to dominate, and at times also on what specific meaning 
the same signifier, such as ‘security’ or ‘stability’, takes in different conjunctures.
In the scholarship on EU’s external relations, the limitations of interest-based 
approaches have largely been addressed with reference to the ‘Normative Power 
Europe’ (NPE) template. Bringing back the scholarly attention on the sui generis 
nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, the NPE literature has focused on 
the EU ability to promote specific norms through its external relations. This 
very emphasis on norms is arguably one of the main limitations of this litera-
ture, which has led Diez to ask ‘whether the idea of normative power does not 
actually belittle the “power” aspect’ (2013: 195). This tendency is to an extent 
replicated in the literature that is critical of NPE, which focuses either on cases 
in which norm promotion is abandoned in the pursuit of material interests (e.g. 
Cavatorta et al., 2008; Hyde-Price, 2006), or on cases in which norm promotion is 
functional to those very interests (e.g. Langan, 2012; Youngs, 2009). As a result, 
this debate has reified the analytical distinction between norms and interests 
into a dichotomy ‘next to impossible to prove’ in ontological terms (Diez, 2013: 
201), with the additional complication that ‘it is difficult if not impossible to 
empirically differentiate between foreign policy that is motivated by norms and 
foreign policy that is motivated by interest’ (ibid: 197).
This increasing dissatisfaction with NPE has recently resulted in publications 
that aim to overcome the opposition between interests and norms by engaging 
with concepts such as hegemony (Diez, 2013) or normative empire (Del Sarto, 
2015). On the one hand, Diez (2013) claims that the NPE literature has assumed 
away power differentials when studying how specific norms and practices have 
diffused from the EU towards other actors in the international system. In order 
to address this deficiency, Diez proposes an analytical shift towards questions 
of hegemony. On the other hand, with direct reference to the EU reaction to the 
Arab uprisings, Del Sarto (2015) has instead argued that the EU actions in the 
Southern Mediterranean region are better understood as those of a ‘normative 
empire’. However, appeal to both hegemony and empire assumes the existence 
of such hegemony and empire, even if subject to constant renegotiation and 
contestation. This is not necessarily unproblematic when one looks at the long 
series of fiascos in the EU’s engagement with the region. These detail the inabil-
ity of the EU to persuade its counterparts of the mutual benefits to be derived 
from following the EU’s material and ideational lead (an element characteristic 
of hegemony), as well as its limitations in effectively exploiting its power differ-
ential to force decisions onto Southern Mediterranean partners (an element tra-
ditionally associated with empire). Rather, the EU’s increasing inability to shape 
what is normal à la Manners, and indeed its attempt to cope with an imposed 
‘new normal’ (see Geddes and Hadj-Abdou [2017] on migration), together with 
the ability of some partner countries to project their own interests onto the EU 
(Durac [2017] on counterterrorism), suggest the importance of paying more 
sustained attention to these very interactions.
Moving in this direction, the next section proposes frames as a mid-range 
concept within which the articulation of both norms and interests held by a 
plurality of actors takes place. In contrast to discussions around empire and 
hegemony, frames have a much clearer scope of empirical applicability, thus 
allowing for more fine-grained empirical accounts across different policy areas.
Reframing frames: the security–stability nexus in 
Euro-Mediterranean relations
The literature on frames tends to mirror the dichotomy between rationalist and 
instrumentalist approaches on the one hand and constructivist approaches 
on the other hand. Instead of essentializing this analytical separation between 
material and ideational elements, this section proposes a relational definition of 
frames, conceived as the result of a process of social and political construction, 
negotiation and at times contestation among different groups. As narratives 
through which actors interpret uncertain and problematic situations, frames 
might change over time and take different interpretations depending on the 
policy area under consideration and the actors with access to defining the very 
frame.
In light of its pervasiveness in both the literature on and practice of Euro-
Mediterranean relations, and following existing literature on frames in social 
movements, this section takes the security–stability nexus as the ‘master 
frame’ around which the EU defines the issues to be tackled when approaching 
Southern Mediterranean partners. It then discusses how security and stability, 
as well as the nexus between them, might take different meanings in different 
sectors at different points in time. Hence, rather than a change of the master 
frame, one might also identify changes in the master frame – that is: a ‘reframing’ 
(Laws & Rein, 2003) – brought about by the need to make sense of a changing 
situation and provide guide for action. The possibility of reframing rather than 
wholesale frame change is arguably enhanced by the fact that resonance – that 
is: the affinity of some ideas and proposed solutions to an already accepted 
framework – is known to be a key factor in whether a frame is successful or not 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Payne, 2001). To fully grasp whether we see a change in 
or of the master frame, one also needs to pay specific attention to the modalities 
of EU’s engagement with specific actors in the region, so as to understand not 
only how frames are enacted as policies, but also how they are transformed by 
this very engagement.
From a general and broadly accepted perspective, frames are ways of inter-
preting information, by ‘promot[ing] a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 
1993: 52). In doing this, they simplify reality by organizing events and pro-
cesses in a way that permits to identify an issue and provides a roadmap for 
addressing it (Bardwell, 1991; Dery, 2000). Frames usually perform this function 
by establishing relationships of ‘cause-effect’, ‘good-bad’, etc. (cf. Bicchi, 2007; 
Huber, 1991). Beyond this common ground, the literature bifurcates into two 
paths that to a significant extent resemble the discussion in the previous section.
On the one hand, in a rational-choice tradition, frames are mainly intended 
as strategic, manipulative and rhetorical tools that can be activated instrumen-
tally by actors to influence policy dynamics and the distribution of resources. 
Through the strategic deployment of frames, actors mobilize biases and shape 
the agenda of policy-making, thus excluding certain issues from the debate and 
defining the scope of the conflict between alternatives (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962; Princen, 2011; Schattschneider, 1960). The contest of frames is thus aimed 
at influencing the policy process by shifting its outcomes closer to the exoge-
nously formed preferences of the actor conducting the framing process (e.g. 
Daviter, 2011; Klüver et al., 2015; Trommer, 2011).
On the other hand, a constructivist understanding maintains that ‘it is the 
frames held by the actors that determine what they see as being in their inter-
ests and, therefore, what interests they perceive as conflicting’ (Schoen & Rein, 
1994: 29). According to this tradition, frames only make sense in a process of 
interaction characterized by argumentation, discussion and persuasion in which 
there is an attempt to convince the other side of the validity of an argument, 
and change the perceptions of the actors involved. Snow (2004: 384) argues 
that ‘meanings do not automatically or naturally attach themselves to objects, 
events or experiences we encounter, but often arise, instead, through inter-
actively based interpretative processes’. In the case of the EU, frames are thus 
the result of processes of social construction both within the EU (e.g. among 
policy-makers) and between the EU and its partners (who can also shape how 
the EU perceives the ‘other’). More importantly, it is not so much the contest 
of frames as stable objects and tools that matters, like in a rationalist reading, 
but the ‘interplay between belief and doubt [which] generates efforts to make 
sense of a changing situation and to coordinate action’ (Laws & Rein, 2003: 174). 
Frames can therefore change when actors face a new, uncertain and challenging 
situation.
At the same time, these processes of social construction do not occur in a 
vacuum. Rather, they are affected by material factors, or – more precisely – by 
the actors’ knowledge and perception of relevant material factors, which in turn 
shape the understanding of their own self-interest, creating the conditions for 
(bounded) strategic action (Hay & Wincott, 1998). Reference to strategic action, 
on the one hand, implies that actors involved in framing can and do behave 
instrumentally, and engage in processes of ‘strategic framing’ (Barnett, 1999). 
On the other hand, reference to material factors points towards the relevance 
of power and politics to how framing works. This is visible with respect to what 
the social movement literature calls ‘political opportunity structure’ (Benford 
& Snow, 2000: 628). Within this special issue, the contribution on migration 
(Geddes & Hadj-Adbou, 2017) is especially forceful in pointing out the relevance 
of constraints that the EU cannot really negotiate, but rather has to learn to cope 
with. The role of power and politics is also visible in how resources are mobilized 
towards maximizing the chances that one’s own preferred frame prevails. With 
reference to the EU in the Southern Mediterranean, this is demonstrated here 
by the two contributions on the political economy of EU’s relations with the 
Southern Mediterranean (Kourtelis, 2017; Roccu, 2017).
Because frames are the result of a process of interpretation and sense-making 
of reality (Weick, 1995), from the specific positionality of the actors proposing 
them, a broad and generic frame can be articulated in a series of different narra-
tives. Here the notion of ‘master frame’ from the literature on social movements 
can shed some light on the scope for differentiation within the same frame. As 
suggested by Snow and Benford (1992), master frames are generic types of 
collective action frames whose articulations and attributions are sufficiently 
elastic, flexible and inclusive to the extent that different social movements can 
adopt and deploy them in different campaigns. While the literature on social 
movements has predominantly viewed ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ as master frames, 
Watson (2012) points out how ‘security’, especially as interpreted by the secu-
ritization approach, can also be conceived as a master frame. This consideration 
opens the door for understanding security as a socially constructed frame that 
informs policies.
This point is particularly relevant when it comes to the analysis of EU policies 
towards the Southern Mediterranean, which have long been characterized by 
what most of the literature considers a nexus between security and stability. 
Instead of considering security and stability as two exogenously determined 
and objective interests of the EU vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean, the secu-
rity–stability nexus can be conceptualized as a socially constructed frame, with 
its core elements relationally and contingently defined. Security and stability 
can therefore take multiple meanings depending on the context (here: policy 
area), on the actors with access to ‘fixing’ such meaning, and on the impact of 
what are perceived as exogenous shocks, such as the Arab uprisings themselves. 
Precisely in light of this flexibility and elasticity, the security–stability nexus has 
over time come to constitute a master frame shaping the EU’s understanding of 
how the Southern Mediterranean region functions, thus informing its policies 
and their enactment.
If one is to explore the transformations experienced by each of these terms, 
security is certainly the one that has seen the largest expansion in its potential 
uses. Traditionally, security has largely been intended as the protection of a 
territory and of a governance structure from material harm that can be caused 
by actors external to the polity. This idea of survival is based on a classical realist 
view of security (Mearsheimer, 2001; Walt, 1985). With the end of the bipolar 
world, this narrow conceptualization of security became increasingly contested, 
and in a particularly powerful and successful way in the securitization litera-
ture. While highly differentiated internally (cf. McDonald, 2008; Stritzel, 2007; 
Waever, 2012), this literature has broadened the agenda of security studies to 
new forms of threats, including economic, societal, political and environmental 
ones. Certain issues can thus be portrayed and socially constructed as existential 
threats and brought beyond or outside ‘normal’ politics through a process of 
securitization that works via linguistic representations and utterances (speech 
acts) (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitization processes have for instance been applied 
to migrants and asylum-seekers, portraying them as existential threats to the 
sovereignty and identity of states (e.g. Bigo, 1998; Huysmans, 2000). Adding to 
these extensions of the concept of security, Mitzen (2006b) has proposed a focus 
on ontological security. This refers to the identity of the self and the need for 
each individual and state to ‘feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves’ 
(p. 342). Accordingly, this need for security is determined by the fact that agency 
requires stability of the cognitive environment, so that an actor knows what to 
expect and can thus relate means to ends and define which priorities to pursue.
Similarly, the meaning of stability is also far from self-evident. While certainly 
not underpinned by a sophisticated literature such as the one on security, sta-
bility can also take on a number of meanings in international politics (Dowding 
& Kimber, 1983). It can for instance be understood on a relatively micro level, as 
the expectation of a certain continuity in diplomatic and bureaucratic practices 
or the guarantee against unlawful forms of expropriation for a country’s own 
companies acting abroad (Jandhyala et al., 2011). But stability can also be inter-
preted in broader terms, for instance as the low likelihood of a major change 
in the foreign policy orientation of a counterpart, or indeed as the substantial 
continuity with respect to the key power-holders with whom one negotiates 
(Hurwitz, 1973). These understandings of stability are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and indeed are often thought of as interdependent.
A similar relation of interdependence and mutual implication tends to link 
security and stability. If security can be understood as a status-oriented con-
cept, in that it defines a specific goal that can be achieved in a variety of ways, 
stability is more process-oriented, as it implies a sense of continuity over time. 
Through explicit consideration of a temporal dimension, stability evokes at least 
the potential for change. In face of possible disruptions, stability can be re-es-
tablished through processes of ‘routinisation’, which in turn enable the pursuit 
of security (Mitzen, 2006b: 346–7). Importantly, this holds from both a rationalist 
and a constructivist standpoint. For the former, instability is costly insofar as 
it heightens uncertainty (Morrow, 1994), and ‘uncertainty can make it hard to 
act’ (Mitzen, 2006a: 272). For the latter, a breakdown in stability has negative 
implications for the cognitive environment alluded to earlier, thus leading to 
ontological insecurity. This further highlights the importance of frames from 
both these perspectives, as the effects of instability on security can be dealt 
with either through the establishment of new frames for interpreting reality or 
through the adaptation of old frames in a way that is consistent with the new 
situation.
The EU’s master frame with respect to the Southern Mediterranean projects 
the general idea that security is maximized through the preservation of stability 
in the region. As demonstrated by the EU preference for relatively ‘harmless’ 
projects focusing on children and women rights (Bicchi, 2009), and the very 
limited engagement with Islamist parties and movements (Durac & Cavatorta, 
2009; Joffé, 2008), the EU has historically appeared rather reluctant to chal-
lenge the status quo in the region. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, stability 
was largely understood as referring to continuity in the ruling elites of partner 
countries, with this in turn considered the best guarantee for achieving the 
EU security, materially but also ontologically. This framing was also very much 
embraced, fostered and promoted by regimes in the region, which consistently 
portrayed their power and grip over society as necessary for political stability, 
economic development and a series of guarantees, such as migration control 
(Beinin, 2009).
As frames are not natural and neutral, but rather the result of processes of 
social construction and interpretation, a variety of actors are involved in their 
formulation, codification and institutionalization. Two sets of actors are involved 
in the construction of the EU’s security–stability nexus vis-à-vis the Southern 
Mediterranean. On the one hand, the EU’s multilevel governance structure 
(Grande, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Krahmann, 2003) means that different 
actors have access to the policy-making process and contribute to framing 
practices. As highlighted in the literature on agenda-setting (e.g. Daviter, 2011; 
Princen, 2011) and lobbying (e.g. Eising et al., 2015; Kurzer & Cooper, 2013), this 
creates significant scope of conflict in the process of frame construction among 
EU institutions and the various interest groups aiming to influence issue defi-
nition as well as the prospective solutions offered.1 On the other hand, actors 
in third countries, especially elites and regimes, are often in a privileged rela-
tionship with the EU and, via frequent interactions deriving from the highly 
institutionalized setting of the ENP, also wield some degree of influence on how 
a frame is constructed.
Hence, the key argument advanced by the special issue is that the specific 
articulations of the security–stability nexus, before and after the Arab uprisings, 
depend not only on the policy area under consideration, but also on the variety 
of actors involved, and on the forms of their involvement. Crucially, some of 
these actors are located in the partner countries, and it is imperative to study 
whether and how the EU deals with them. For this reason, the following section 
focuses on the EU engagement with the Southern Mediterranean.
Enacting the security–stability nexus: patterns of engagement 
in Euro-Mediterranean relations
The previous two sections have established the foundations for this special 
issue. We have first contested the tendency of existing literature to discuss EU 
policies towards the Southern Mediterranean after the Arab uprisings simply in 
terms of continuity, and we have suggested that this limitation is partly related 
to debates on EU’s external relations revolving around a not necessarily help-
ful dichotomy between norms and interests. We have then seen how a similar 
dichotomy between instrumentalist and constructivist approaches is replicated 
in debates on the role of frames in policy-making, and have thus argued for 
a relational approach to studying them. We have also shown that the secu-
rity–stability nexus has been so pervasive in EU policies towards the Southern 
Mediterranean to be considered as a master frame, which can then find different 
instantiations depending on the policy area under consideration.
This section provides a framework that captures how and with whom the 
EU engages in the Southern Mediterranean, and how this affects the specific 
articulations of the master frame. Engagement is taken here in its more general 
meaning as the range of practices of contact, formal or otherwise, between the 
EU and relevant actors in partner countries. If frames are to be taken as relational, 
then the actors involved in their definition and enactment, as well as the ways in 
which they are engaged, might influence the ways in which the security–stability 
master frame is articulated in different policy areas.
The contributions to this special issue explore two different dimensions of 
engagement. The first refers to the modalities of engagement. Here a heuristic 
distinction based on the means of engagement is proposed, inspired by the 
distinction between logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness (March 
& Olsen, 1998; Checkel, 2005). On the one hand, material means of engagement 
aim at altering the cost–benefit calculations of the counterpart, either through 
coercion or through the provision of material incentives such as EU funds and 
market access. On the other hand, discursive means of engagement encompass 
a wide range of tools, from dialogue – institutionalized or otherwise – to twin-
ning programmes aiming to foster socialization and norm diffusion. The second 
dimension of engagement focuses on the inclusiveness of the EU approach in 
different policy areas, and thus looks at which Southern Mediterranean actors 
are included in the decision-making process. On the more exclusionary end of 
the spectrum, the EU engages only with government actors and the respective 
bureaucracy. There are then more inclusive forms of engagement, which might 
range from the inclusion of sectorial non-state elites to broader processes in 
which civil society organizations (CSOs) at large play a role. Depending on the 
policy area under consideration, a different articulation of the security–stability 
master frame leads to different forms of engagement. Because of this, while 
security and stability might always be at the core of the policies proposed by 
the EU in different sectors, as suggested by interest-based accounts, the very 
interests and norms underpinning the specific articulation of the security–sta-
bility nexus vary widely.
How? Modalities of engagement. Material means of engagement
The first and most evident form of engagement is based on material exchanges 
and builds on an incentive-based logic. Here, the aim is to tilt the cost–benefit 
calculation faced by the counterpart, conceived as acting strategically towards 
the maximization of its perceived interests. A tool that actors can use to influ-
ence the decisions of others is conditionality, which aims to influence an actor’s 
behaviour by linking certain benefits to the fulfilment of previously established 
conditions (cf. Grabbe, 2001; Sasse, 2008; Smith, 1998). The nature of the obliga-
tions can vary greatly, from political criteria (e.g. democratic principles, protec-
tion of human rights, etc.) to economic and legal requirements (e.g. structural 
reforms, acquis communautaire).
Although the effectiveness of conditionality has been assessed mostly in con-
texts where EU membership was at stake (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), 
the replication of the enlargement framework in the ENP suggests that condition-
ality is expected to play a role also in relations with Southern Mediterranean coun-
tries (Kelley, 2006). ENP partners are promised a re-evaluation of their relationship, 
in terms of increased free movement of people and goods in the EU’s internal 
market, if they make concrete progress on the priorities established in the Action 
Plans (European Commission, 2003). In the ENP South, the EU’s material engage-
ment with its partners is predominantly based on two types of resources. On the 
one hand, the EU provides third countries with money and funding, established 
on a multiannual basis and according to jointly agreed priorities. Indicatively, 
the EU was quick at increasing the money devoted to Tunisia and Egypt in the 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings, with a view to supporting and contributing to 
the democratic transitions following the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak. On the other 
hand, the EU offers to its partners another set of material incentives such as 
access to its internal market, relaxation of movement restrictions, and so on, in 
exchange for reforms in certain areas. The ‘more for more’ principle espoused by 
the Commission and the EEAS in the wake of the Arab uprisings conjoins these 
two mechanisms, as it provides increased support in terms of money, enhanced 
mobility and access to the internal market (also called the 3 M) to those countries 
that go furthest on the reform path (European Commission, 2011a).
With respect to its targets, material engagement can work with different com-
ponents in the society of a partner country, as incentives can be made available 
to various sections of civil society. However, the regime/government usually 
remains the preeminent target, as the EU normally engages and negotiates 
these issues, including financial incentives, with those in power.
Discursive means of engagement
Whereas the use of material incentives tends to be driven by a logic of expected 
consequences, the EU also relies on other forms of engagement that instead 
place a greater weight on processes of socialization, learning, persuasion and 
argumentation, aiming to diffuse (EU) norms and values. Following the expec-
tations of constructivist literature, actors tend to adopt either a logic of argu-
ing based on normative suasion (Risse, 2000), or a course of action deemed 
appropriate for their role in the specific context at hand, and hence a logic of 
appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998). Conceiving means of engagement in 
terms of their operational logic is more productive than the tendency of the 
literature on civilian, soft and normative power (cf. Dûchene, 1973; Nye, 2004; 
Manners, 2002) to include all non-military tools in their respective category. This 
approach has been criticized in the literature, as the nature of the means does 
not necessarily imply that the mechanisms underpinning it are not coercive or 
based on a cost–benefit calculation, such as economic awards in the form of 
market access and technical assistance or aid (cf. Tocci, 2007).
Discursive engagement is also part of the EU policy toolkit in the Southern 
Mediterranean. Following the enlargement template, material incentives have 
been combined with the attempt to influence partners through the transfor-
mation of societal norms and the perceived interests and identities (Kelley, 
2006; Tocci, 2007). It has even been argued that the ENP is a framework for 
socialization, understood as a process through which ‘the EU reflects on the 
impact of its policies with the partner countries, in particular, through encour-
aging local ownership and practising positive conditionality’ (Manners, 2010: 
42). This is evident in the emphasis put on partnership and joint ownership in 
the ENP Strategy Paper (European Commission, 2004). It is also reflected in the 
ENP framework, which has established a series of venues (institutional and not) 
for dialogue between the EU and its partners, ranging from the highly political 
Association Councils to technical committees established according to policy 
areas. Through these venues, there is thus space for socialization, social learning 
and norm diffusion to take place.
As already exemplified with reference to enlargement and ENP, while mate-
rial and discursive modalities of engagement are presented here as analyti-
cally distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the EU can choose which 
modalities to use and with which intensity to employ them in different areas 
and we can thus conceive of the interaction between these two modalities as 
a continuum. This is especially important for how the security–stability master 
frame is enacted in different policy areas. On the one side, in some areas the EU 
might devote substantial material resources and resort extensively to discursive 
means of engagement in institutionalized settings. On the opposite side, we find 
those policy areas in which the EU has very limited engagement in terms of both 
its material and discursive means. This is a case where engagement is limited, 
predominantly informal and where there might even be a sort of ‘delegation’ to 
member states in their bilateral dealings with the third country. Between these 
two poles, there are intermediate cases in which the EU privileges one modality 
over the other. Where the different policy areas are positioned is a matter of 
empirical analysis, carried out by the individual contributions and discussed 
comparatively in the conclusion to this special issue.
With whom? Actors along the inclusion/exclusion spectrum
While the EU is often presented as an open system providing access to poli-
cy-making to a range of actors (e.g. Geddes, 2000; Mazey & Richardson, 1993), 
the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations finds that in the region the EU 
prefers to engage with the regimes in power, instead of reaching out to broader 
segments of the society (Cavatorta et al., 2008). Even when the EU engages 
with civil society, its support to the private sector tends to favour business 
actors tied to the regimes via patronage networks (Jünemann, 2002). Moreover, 
engagement with CSOs has also been rather selective, as the EU has preferred 
to deal with organizations that are not highly politicized or critical of incumbent 
regimes, usually excluding relevant components of the population, especially 
Islamist actors (Bicchi, 2009; Burgat, 2009; Cavatorta, 2006; Jünemann, 2002).
Engagement can therefore take various forms along an inclusionary–exclu-
sionary continuum. While engagement with regimes and government has to 
take place almost by default, as part of the ENP framework, dealing only with 
those in power can be viewed as an exclusionary practice, as the majority of the 
actors are not involved in the process and also risk not receiving any benefit from 
the EU-partner country cooperation. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the 
EU engages with all sectors of the population, from the regime to various CSOs. 
This is the most inclusionary practice. Between these two extremes, there are 
various possibilities that lead to discretionary engagement.
With whom the EU decides to engage is shaped by the frame informing its 
policies, as it identifies the perceived interests to be protected and the partners 
best placed to do so. There are therefore a set of dispositions defining the EU 
decision about the actors to deal with. However, this in itself does not determine 
neither the modalities of engagement nor the actors to be engaged with, as 
local dynamics in the partner country, usually related to the highly uneven dis-
tribution of power, might prevent the EU from interacting with certain sectors of 
the society. By doing so, a given EU interpretation of the security–stability nexus 
could be challenged or, in contrast, confirmed and strengthened. This point on 
the importance of partner countries for frame enactment, and its feedback to 
frame (re-)definition, emerges from several contributions and we return to it 
in the conclusion.
As in the case of the modalities of engagement, the actors with whom the 
EU engages are subject to variation. These depend on both objective and 
contingent constraints. The former result on the fact that each policy area is 
composed of a given set of actors, whose relevance for EU policies can vary. 
Contingent constraints are instead related to how the security–stability master 
frame is enacted and to local power dynamics (and hence the possibilities of 
interactions that exist). It is again an empirical question to find who is included 
and excluded by EU policies, whether engagement only takes place with those 
that hold power and concentrated interests, or whether those representing 
diffused interests are also involved.
While for analytical purposes the two dimensions are presented sepa-
rately here, the EU’s engagement is simultaneously defined by both of them. 
Depending on where the EU’s engagement is located on both dimensions, there 
are thus different possible patterns of engagement ranging from full engage-
ment to no engagement, with a large space in between characterized by differ-
ent ‘varieties of selective engagement’. This selectivity can occur both when the 
EU privileges one modality of engagement over the other and when it excludes 
or marginalizes relevant Southern Mediterranean stakeholders. Most policies are 
thus expected to fit into one of these varieties, on the basis of the way in which 
the master frame is enacted in each policy area as well as the interactions that 
take place on the ground. While we might expect EU policies to have become 
less selective in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, this remains an open empir-
ical question. Whether policies have changed depends on an eventual change 
in the frame as well as on more contingent and domestic factors that influence 
the EU’s perceptions and responses. Thus, the combination of modalities and 
actors is conceived as a heuristic tool providing the foundations for a compar-
ison across policy areas in the conclusion.
Outline of the special issue
In light of the framework proposed above, each contribution to this special issue 
investigates whether there has been any change in their policy area, whether 
the interpretation of the security–stability nexus has undergone any change 
and how this translates into concrete policies through engagement. The first 
two contributions focus on the political economy of Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions. Kourtelis (2017) discusses policy change in the agricultural sector, which 
has been embodied in the European Neighbourhood Policy Agricultural and 
Rural Development (ENPARD) programme. This aims at creating an integrated 
framework for agricultural development in ENP countries and at including SMEs. 
Although Kourtelis suggests that these changes are not merely cosmetic, this 
contribution also demonstrates that greater engagement has been skewed 
towards EU-based actors, which have in turn reinforced a specific understand-
ing of security and stability. This situation undermines the position of local 
actors in the decision-making process, and especially the development of 
small producers. Roccu’s contribution reaches a similar conclusion with refer-
ence to EU-promoted regulatory reforms in the Egyptian banking sector. In 
this case, the pursuit of security, stability and profits on the part of the EU has 
been strongly influenced by ordoliberal ideas and practices. The EU’s attempt 
towards broadening engagement after Mubarak’s overthrow has been largely 
predicated on these same assumptions, with the result that this continuity in 
the face of fast-changing circumstances has led to declining EU influence on 
Egyptian economic policy-making under Sisi.
The following two contributions focus on different aspects of political rela-
tions between the EU and Tunisia and Egypt. Dandashly (2017) focuses on EU 
democracy promotion activities, suggesting that they have changed only at the 
margins after the Arab uprisings. Importantly, the EU appears more success-
ful in engaging with CSOs in Tunisia than Egypt. This differential engagement 
is attributed to the persistent influence of a traditional interpretation of the 
security–stability nexus in terms of hard security and regime stability as well 
as the reaction of partners in the two countries. In contrast, and with reference 
to Islamist political parties, Voltolini and Colombo (2017) show that the EU’s 
interpretation of the security–stability nexus, interpreted in terms of threats to 
EU ontological security, has partially changed in the wake of the Arab uprisings. 
By differentiating between various forms of political Islam, the EU has started 
to engage with Ennahda in Tunisia, while its engagement with the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood has been less successful. In their analysis of the different 
forms of engagement, Voltolini and Colombo highlight how the transformation 
in practices has been highly selective, influenced by a form of pragmatism that 
is by necessity sensitive to the reaction on the part of local actors.
The ability on the part of Southern Mediterranean regimes to affect the 
EU’s understanding of security and stability is also at the heart of (Durac, 2017) 
contribution on counterterrorism policy. In this sector the tension between 
democratization and security through regime stability is arguably at its highest. 
Durac suggests that the strong focus on relations with the regime intrinsic to 
counterterrorism has allowed partner regimes to engage in an ‘externalisation 
in reverse’, thereby leading the EU to abandon normative aspirations in favour 
of more traditional security considerations. This trend does not appear to have 
been altered after the Arab uprisings, thus leading Durac to suggest that EU’s 
counterterrorism policy is still essentially geared towards avoiding ‘destabilisa-
tion by democratisation’ (Eder, 2011).
The final contributions look at policies increasingly understood as more 
directly security-related. Herranz-Surrallés (2017) focuses on Euro-Mediterranean 
energy relations, and her analysis suggests that the market-liberal frame orient-
ing EU energy policies towards the region before the Arab uprisings has been 
partially reframed from within as well as ‘misframed’ from outsiders. However, 
and in line with other contributions, the implications of this reframing in terms 
of changes in policy and engagement are yet to fully materialize. Focusing more 
on the cognitive transformations on the EU side, Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2017) 
examine the transformations in migration governance triggered by the Arab 
uprisings. They present a robust case for a more significant change in framing 
security and stability with reference to migration compared to most other policy 
areas addressed in the special issue. At the same time, this has not translated yet 
into substantive change in EU migration governance because of the constraints 
posed by what the authors call ‘migration politics’ inside EU member states. 
Finally, Wolff (2017) contribution addresses the issue of religious diplomacy, 
a policy area that has arguably risen to prominence exactly as a result of the 
Arab uprisings, and of the EU’s perception of having failed in the promotion 
of its secular-liberal model. This realization has resulted in at least two signif-
icant policy changes: the provision of training on religion focused on EU and 
member states’ diplomats on the one hand, and the strengthening of relations 
with regime-controlled ‘moderate’ forms of Islam in the case of Morocco and 
Jordan on the other hand. At the same time, Wolff suggests that these changes 
are better understood as a recalibration aimed at better exporting the EU’s 
secular-liberal model in the neighbourhood, and through this strengthening its 
security and stability, now conceived more broadly. Indeed, this broadening of 
the scope of the security–stability nexus appears as a common thread among 
the majority of the contributions to this special issue. Why this might be the case, 
and what have been the consequences on the modalities and inclusiveness of 
engagement, is explored in the conclusions.
Note
1.  In order to avoid a further broadening of the scope of the analysis, the EU is
the focal point of this special issue. While member states (beyond the Council
formation) and other non-state actors are addressed in some contributions, this 
only occurs to the extent in which they bring something specific to EU policy, or 
when their own autonomous actions demonstrate the weaknesses of the EU’s
position and possibly even shape it.
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